Only 13% of OT segments keep operational technology isolated

Introduction: A worrying reality for industrial network security

In a world where cyber attacks on critical infrastructures As cyberattacks become more common and sophisticated, a new report published in 2026 sheds a worrying light on the security state of operational technology (OT) networks. According to recent research, only 13% of OT network segments manage to maintain true operational technology isolation compared to other networks, including corporate IT networks and the Internet. This alarming statistic raises serious questions about how industrial organizations manage the security of their critical systems, from electrical grids and water supply systems to automated factories and oil rigs.

Network segmentation has long been considered one of the most effective methods of protecting OT systems. The basic principle is simple: if an industrial system is properly isolated, the chances of an attacker compromising it through an external digital vector are significantly reduced. However, data from 2026 shows that this essential strategy is only implemented correctly in an extremely small percentage of cases, leaving 87% of OT segments exposed to major cyber risks.

What is OT network segmentation and why is it essential?

Definition and role of segmentation in industrial environments

Operational technology (OT) represents the set of hardware and software used for monitoring and control of physical processes, devices and infrastructureUnlike traditional IT systems, OT systems are directly responsible for the operation of physical equipment, such as turbines, pumps, production lines, and SCADA (Supervisory Control and Data Acquisition) systems. A security breach in an OT system does not only mean data loss, but can have devastating real-world consequences: production shutdowns, equipment damage, industrial accidents, and even loss of life.

OT network segmentation involves creating distinct and controlled areas within the network infrastructure so that communication between systems is strictly regulated and monitored. Ideally, a properly segmented OT network implements the principle of "air gap" or at least strict logical separation through industrial firewalls, intrusion detection systems (IDS), and demilitarized zones (DMZs). This architecture prevents lateral propagation of threats and limits the attack surface available to malicious actors.

IT/OT convergence: a miscalculated risk

In recent years, convergence between IT and OT networks has become a dominant trend in the industry, driven by the desire to increase operational efficiency, facilitate access to real-time data, and reduce costs through system integration. But this convergence comes with significant risks. Connecting OT systems to corporate IT networks or the internet exposes operational technology to a wide range of cyber threats that industrial systems were not designed to handle.

Many of the OT devices run on outdated operating systems, without security support, cannot be updated frequently due to 24/7 uptime requirements, and lack modern authentication or encryption mechanisms. Connecting these devices to wider networks without proper segmentation is the equivalent of opening a back door to an organization's critical infrastructure.

What the numbers show: detailed analysis of the 2026 report

Research methodology and data sources

The report that generated these worrying statistics was based on an analysis of millions of connected OT devices from various industry sectors, including energy, manufacturing, utilities, transportation and healthcare. The researchers assessed the degree of isolation of OT network segments by analyzing network traffic, firewall configurations and access policies, identifying unauthorized or insufficiently secured connections between OT networks and other types of networks.

The results were categorical: only 13% of the segments analyzed truly respected the principles of isolation recommended by international standards such as IEC 62443, NIST SP 800-82 and CISA guidelines for industrial control system security. The remaining 87% had at least one uncontrolled or insufficiently secured connection to external networks, be they corporate IT networks, provider networks or even the public internet.

Main vulnerabilities identified

Among the most common problems identified within the analyzed OT segments are:

Direct connections between OT networks and corporate IT networks, without dedicated industrial firewalls or adequate filtering rules Use of insecure remote access protocols, such as RDP (Remote Desktop Protocol) or VNC, exposed directly to the internet Absence of internal segmentation within the OT network, allowing unrestricted communication between all industrial devices Use of default credentials on network devices and programmable logic controllers (PLCs) Lack of continuous monitoring of OT network traffic to detect anomalies and suspicious behaviors Inadequate integration of remote access solutions introduced during the pandemic, which remained active and unsecured

These vulnerabilities are not just theoretical. Major security incidents in recent years, from the attack on Colonial Pipeline to the compromise of Florida's water treatment systems, demonstrates that malicious actors actively exploit segmentation weaknesses to penetrate OT networks and cause significant damage.

Implications for critical sectors

Energy and utilities: high-value targets

The energy sector remains one of the most attractive targets for cyber attackers, especially for state-sponsored groups that seek strategic sabotage or intelligence gathering. Electrical grids, natural gas distribution systems, and water treatment infrastructure are also among the most complex and difficult to secure OT environments. Inadequate segmentation in these sectors can allow an attacker to traverse from an administrative network to the control systems of a power plant, with potentially catastrophic consequences.

En 2026, ransomware attacks on utility operators continued to grow, with threat groups increasingly exploiting the interfaces between IT and OT networks. Once an attacker gains initial access to a corporate IT network, the absence of proper segmentation allows them to move laterally into OT systems, either to extract data or disrupt operations.

Industrial production and automation

In the manufacturing sector, the massive adoption of Industry 4.0 and I conceptsIoT (Industrial Internet of Things) has connected thousands of industrial devices to digital networks, creating an unprecedented attack surface. Automated production lines, collaborative robots, and manufacturing management systems (MES) are now interconnected in a way that, while delivering significant operational benefits, also creates critical vulnerabilities in the absence of rigorous segmentation.

A successful attack on an OT system in a factory is not limited to direct financial losses. Production interruption, damage to expensive equipment, compromise of product quality and employee safety risks are real consequences of poor OT security. The 2026 report highlights that the manufacturing sector is one of the most affected by inadequate segmentation issues, in part due to the speed of adoption of new connected technologies without a proper security strategy.

Why do organizations fail to implement OT segmentation?

Technical complexity and legacy of old systems

One of the main barriers to implementing effective OT segmentation is the technical complexity of industrial environments and the presence of a large number of legacy systems. Many organizations operate equipment that is 20-30 years old, designed in an era when network connectivity was not a requirement and cybersecurity was not a concern. Integrating these systems into a modern and secure network architecture is a major technical challenge, requiring specialized expertise and substantial financial resources.

In addition, any intervention on an active OT system involves significant operational risksUnlike IT environments, where updates and reconfigurations can be scheduled into regular maintenance windows, OT systems often operate in a continuous operation mode, and shutting them down to implement security measures can be extremely costly or even impossible without disrupting critical processes.

Lack of expertise and risk awareness

Another major factor contributing to the current situation is the acute shortage of professionals with combined expertise in IT and OT. Industrial systems security is a specialized discipline that requires an understanding of both cyber principles and the specifics of industrial operations. Such professionals are rare and highly sought after in the job market in the field. cybersecurity.

Also, in many industrial organizations, responsibility for OT systems lies with process engineers, not cybersecurity teams. This organizational separation leads to a lack of communication and collaboration, with direct implications for the ability to implement and maintain effective network segmentation.

Recommendations and best practices for improving OT insulation

Adopting a layered security model

OT security experts recommend adopting a defense-in-depth security model, which combines several protection mechanisms to reduce risk. This model includes:

Implementing a Purdue model or ISA/IEC 62443 architecture for hierarchical structuring of the OT network Creating distinct security zones, with well-defined access policies between each zone Using industrial firewalls and specialized IDS/IPS systems for OT traffic Implementing the principle of least privilege for all accounts and devices in the OT network Continuous monitoring of OT network traffic with specialized solutions, such as Claroty, Dragos or Nozomi Networks Performing periodic security audits and penetration tests specific to OT environments

Prioritizing visibility and asset inventory

A fundamental aspect, often neglected, is lack of a complete and updated inventory of all OT assetsOrganizations cannot protect what they do not know. Implementing passive asset discovery solutions, which identify all devices connected to the OT network without disrupting industrial communications, is an essential first step towards effective segmentation.

Once complete visibility is achieved, organizations can assess the risks associated with each asset, prioritize remedial measures and define segmentation policies based on the criticality of systems and the real communication needs between devices. This data-driven approach is much more efficient than implementing generic policies, which may be too restrictive for some systems or not strict enough for others.

Conclusion: The Urgency of a New Level of Maturity in OT Security

Statistics according to which only 13% of OT segments maintain authentic isolation is not just a technical indicator; it is a warning signal with profound implications for national security, operational continuity, and the protection of critical infrastructure globally. As Cyber ​​attacks are becoming more targeted and sophisticated, and IT/OT convergence continues to accelerate, industrial organizations can no longer afford to treat OT security as a secondary priority.

Remedying this situation requires a holistic approach, which combines investments in technology, development of human expertise, review of organizational processes and adopting internationally recognized security standards. Proper segmentation of OT networks is not a luxury or an option; it is an absolute necessity for any organization operating critical industrial systems in an ever-evolving threat landscape.

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